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Abstract 
 
The magnitude of the financial crisis in 2008 can be compared to the financial downturn and 
the great depression in the 1930´s. Even though we are currently in a situation where we are 
recovering from this crisis it is most likely that we will experience a financial crisis again. 
Basel III is constructed in order to ensure that the impact of future crises not becomes as 
severe as the previous one. Will the Basel III accord manage to do this? In this paper the 
Basel III framework will be presented and its impacts be analysed, focusing on the Swedish 
financial system. We will also provide the reader insights from Länsförsäkringar Bank on 
how they apprehend on the Basel III accord. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Purpose 
The purpose of this paper is to present the Basel III framework. We will also provide an 
answer to what factors forced the decision makers to create such a system and how the system 
is constituted. We will explain what the consequences will be for the Swedish banking 
industry, using the FIR report by Jaffee and Walden. 
 
From improving the stability of the financial sector, which is the main objective of Basel III, 
the implementation will consequently lead to changes in the banks constitution of assets, 
capital and liquidity. We will see if these changes substantially will affect the costs for 
Swedish banks and how these changes will affect Sweden’s GDP, both in the transitional 
period and in medium-long run. 
 
As an example on this matter we will provide insights from Länsförsäkringar Bank. We find 
this bank especially interesting since it, in comparison with the other - larger - business banks 
in Sweden, is relatively young. As for many other banks, its future depends much on access to 
funding and capital. 
1.2 Delimitations 
Along with the implementation of the Basel III regulations there is an ongoing parallel 
adoption of the Solvency II directive. Solvency II is a framework created by the EU member 
states aiming to unite and harmonize the EU insurance market in order to increase customer 
protection. Since the banking industry and insurance sector often co-operates, and especially 
in our case of Länsförsäkringar Bank which alone operates in both areas, the Solvency II 
directive will most likely make a significant impact. However, due to the scope of this paper 
and the complexity of the Basel frameworks we choose not to include the Solvency II 
directive in our study, and choose instead to focus on the Basel frameworks and its outcomes. 
Further, the Basel III framework is supposed to affect all of the member countries banking 
systems. Although, we will limit this paper to examine the effects only in the Swedish bank 
system. Finally, when describing the financial crisis of 2008, this cannot be done without 
having a global perspective. 
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1.3 Sources and method 
The literature used in this paper is primarily reports and documents published by international 
and national economic organizations such as the Bank of International Settlements (BIS), the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Swedish Financial Markets Roundtable, along 
with articles from private consultancy bureaus and economic journals. In the section intended 
for Länsförsäkringar Bank we will render information obtained from Länsförsäkringar Bank 
on how they apprehend Basel III through an interview with credit manager. 
1.4 Structure of the paper 
In order to do give answers to the question stated in the purpose section we will begin by 
presenting a short retrospect on the financial crisis in the 1930’s and the Banking Act of 1933, 
which serves as a predecessor to the modern regulations on banking. Then we will describe 
the concepts of capital and liquidity in banking since these are essential concepts in this paper, 
followed by a presentation of the Basel Committee of Banking Supervision (BCBS) and the 
previous frameworks of Basel I and Basel II. We will then continue to describe the financial 
crisis of 2008. We will explain what factors caused this state of the world economy and in 
what way the constitution of the financial system ultimately led to this crisis. This section will 
also cover  the phenomena of shadow banking, which along with the earlier regulations failed 
to manage a sound approach regarding lending and borrowing in banks and financial 
institutions, which in turn led to the crisis in 2008. Noticeable is that the shadow banking 
system mostly has afflicted the financial systems in the US, Great Britain and France, while 
Sweden has managed to evade this development. Still, as the shadow banking system in part 
caused the financial crisis which then reached the Swedish economy, we stress that this 
information is necessary to provide. 
 
Considering the above we will then map out the intended objectives of Basel III regulation, 
conducted by the G20 members in 2009. We will describe the main purposes, time table and 
the actual framework of Basel III. We will also provide information on the major areas of 
disagreement. As much of the literature we will address the following changes and specify 
how they will impact the banking system; increased quality of capital, increased quantity of 
capital, reduced leverage through introduction of backstop leverage ratio, increase in short-
term liquidity coverage, increased stable long-term balance sheet funding and strengthened 
risk capture. In this section we will also provide insights on the Basel III framework from 
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Länsförsäkringar Bank, which will serve as an illustrative example on how one of the 
Swedish banks agrees to the regulation. Finally, before the paper’s conclusion we will provide 
a summary of the debated critique against the Basel III accord. 
2 Background 
2.1 The Great Depression and the Banking Act of 1933 
Studies performed on the great depression shows on, and focus on, a multitude of 
sources for the immense downturn in U.S. economy in the 1930’s, such as decreased 
consumer demand, financial panics and default in acting from the U.S. government. 
However, due to the topic of this paper we will only briefly elucidate the most debated 
causes for the crisis, and rather focus on the correlation of the U.S. banking system and 
the crisis. 
 
One debated contributive factor to the crisis is the stock market crash in 1929. In the fall 
of 1929 stock prices had reached levels that were not realistic in terms of future 
earnings. The concern of an upcoming stock market bubble, and in order to lower the 
stock market prices the U.S. government chose to increase the interest rates. This caused 
the aggregated spending in construction and automobile industry to decrease, and which 
soon had spread to affect the overall production in the country. The consequences of 
falling prices and the decreasing confidence among investors were the panic selling on 
Black Thursday, October 24 in 1929, where stock prices fell by 33 % from the peak in 
September the very same year. 
 
The panic among investors was soon transferred into bank panic occurring in the 
commercial banking system which experienced the first of a number of bank runs in the 
fall of 1930, forcing the commercial banks to liquidate loans and other credits in order 
to raise the required cash. Bank runs occurred during 1930 through 1932, and as a result 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt declared bank holiday on March 6 in 1933 which 
closed all banks and allowed them to re-open first after being audited and valued solvent 
by government representatives. The banking climate in U.S. at the time was dominated 
by small undiversified banks due to government regulatory and fear of larger banks and 
trusts. Studies show that this climate contributed to the possibility that these bank runs 
occurred and was spread. 
4 
 
As the currency-to-deposit ratio increased among U.S. citizens, it followed that the 
money supply decreased by 30 % between 1929 and 1933 (Bernanke, 1983). The 
decreasing money supply affected aggregated spending negatively and the market 
response was declining expectations in prices and wages that led to a decrease in 
willingness  to borrow money even though nominal interest rates where low. The fact 
that a large number of banks went bankrupt also contributed to lower rates in borrowing 
due to decreasing levels of capital available for finance investment. 
 
The gold standard not only contributed to the magnitude of the crisis but also allowed it 
to spread to the rest of the world. The gold standard created international gold flows due 
to imbalances in trade or asset flows and once then U.S. economy seemed to improve 
large gold inflows to U.S. followed due to the deflation which made U.S. goods 
attractive to foreign countries. At the same time the American citizens decreased their 
demand for foreign goods and services due to decreasing income levels. This 
combination led to a large trade surplus for the U.S, and in turn forced central banks 
around the world to increase their interest rates in order to stem the gold outflows. 
Inevitable, this fact caused a massive decline in output and prices throughout the world. 
 
Hence, the combination of large withdrawals of deposits, insolvent debtors, illiquidity 
of assets, declining asset prices which caused the loan default rate to increase and the 
Fed’s reluctance to act properly along with a massive decline in expectations for 
tomorrows economy explains how the crisis were able to emerge. Regarding the U.S 
banks, one third of them had seized to exist in 1933. 
 
As for sources of recovery one can deduce the currency devaluation by exit from the 
gold standard and monetary expansion. There is an obvious correlation between one 
country’s currency devaluation, which allowed the country to increase the money 
supply without concerns about their exchange rate, and increase in aggregated output. 
The increase in money supply throughout the world led to decreasing interest rates 
which in turn led to increasing demand for credit and higher expectations on prices and 
wages in the future (Bernanke, 1983). 
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The Banking Act of 1933 
The Banking Act of 1933 which was established in the aftermath of the Great 
Depression implied various banking reforms and inauguration of a number of regulative 
institutions, aiming to stabilize the U.S. banking industry and to avoid similar crisis in 
the future. According to Preston (1933) the main features of this act were the following; 
 
- The separation of investment and commercial banking. 
- Restrictions upon the use of bank credit for speculation. 
- Limitations upon private banking. 
- Deposit insurance was introduced. 
- Minimum capital requirements for new national banks. 
- Legislation upon branch banking. 
- Removal of bank officers or directors. 
 
In the aftermath of World War II the financial system was once again threatened. This 
was one of the reasons that caused the world’s leaders to agree on the Bretton Woods 
system which included the establishment of the International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development, which was later grouped into the World Bank (WB), Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS), and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The 
implementation of these institutions combined with the main features in the Banking 
Act of 1933, is viewed as the predecessor of our modern financial system and its 
regulation. 
2.2 What is capital in banking? 
Before we begin presenting the Basel frameworks it is necessary to define the concepts of 
both capital and liquidity in banking since these concepts are central in our study. The word 
capital, in banking, is often misunderstood or misinterpreted. The correct definition of capital 
in banking is simply the amount of funds the bank has received from owners or shareholders, 
along with any profit the bank has made, which is summarized to equity, and not to be seen as 
a bank reserve or as a rainy day reserve. Capital can also be referred to as unborrowed money, 
since it is acquired without any binding on making payments in the future. The opposite to 
unborrowed money would be borrowed money, which is represented by the deposits 
performed by the banks customer, and where the bank is obliged to make payments to the 
customers at any given time (Admati & Hellwig, 2013). When banks make their investments, 
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e.g. issue loans, they are able to use both unborrowed and borrowed money, and the capital 
requirements that is introduced later on in this paper just tells how large share of the funds 
should come from unborrowed money in order to absorb losses if the loan turns out faulty 
(Elliot, 2010). Further, the concept of capital should not be mistaken for cash reserve. While 
capital is not an asset, cash reserve is, in form of vault cash or a reserve balance at the central 
bank, and banks are required to hold a specific amount of cash reserve in order to cover 
customer withdrawals. Cash reserves cannot be used for investments. Apart from stabilizing 
the banking system, the capital requirements can also be used to decide the banks safety and 
soundness compared to other banks. 
2.3 What is liquidity in banking? 
In the Basel III framework that currently is being implemented, liquidity is a key factor. A 
general definition states that liquidity is the ability to convert assets into cash by selling them. 
In banking the liquidity refers to the ability to fund the banks contractual commitments on 
regular basis, i.e. lending and investment obligations, and to fund liabilities that has reached 
their due date as well as deposit withdrawals. When measuring the liquidity of a bank one 
should consider its obligations relative to its funding sources. A bank that holds highly liquid 
assets with short maturities is considered quite liquid because it is able to convert the assets 
into cash on short notice to cover losses, so is a bank with less liquid assets if its funding 
sources are of the long maturity type. However, banks with less liquid assets that are funded 
through short maturity sources, e.g. deposits or short-term debt, faces big risk if it were to 
experience a bank run. 
2.4 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
As a result of the collapse of the German-based Bank Herstatt in 1974 a group of ten nations 
decided to form BCBS which mandate is “…to strengthen the regulation, supervision and 
practices of banks worldwide with the purpose of enhancing financial stability.” (BCBS, 
2013). Today BCBS consists of Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, 
France, Germany, Hong Kong SAR, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, 
Mexico, the Netherlands, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States which each were represented 
in the committee by its central-bank governor. The member nations are invited to quarterly 
based meetings to discuss the status and propose regulatory changes to the international 
banking system. However, the committee does not hold any formal authority, and its 
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proposals do not have, and have never intended to have, any legal force. Instead the goal is to 
formulate supervisory guidelines and to encourage synchronization towards common 
standards for the member states by exchange information on the development in the banking 
sector, address regulatory and supervisory gaps that hold risk to financial stability, sharing 
supervisory issues and techniques, and monitor the implementation of the standards carried 
out by the committee. Thus, it is up to each member state to implement and interpret these 
recommendations (BIS, 2013b). 
2.5 Basel I 
Due to the banking crisis in the early 1980’s that followed from the collapse of the petrodollar 
boom, and due to the fact that internationally active banks were able to avoid regulatory 
authorities by relocate to countries with more loose regulations, the Basel Committee member 
states started outline a common banking capitalization standard in order to stabilize and 
supervise banking activities. In 1988, after six years work, the International Convergence of 
Capital Measurements and Capital Standards, now known as Basel I, came to power. 
 
The standards were constructed in such way to fit and to be implemented only within the 
member states, which all were viewed as developed states with relative sound economies, and 
therefore not optimal for emerging markets due to specific risks and regulatory problems in 
these states. Further, the framework was created to provide adequate capital in order to protect 
the bank only from risks in their own loan book positions’ credit rating. It was not constructed 
to guard against external risks related to changes in the state currency or interest rate, nor 
against other macro economic problems. Instead the Basel Committee suggested that each 
member state should construct their own sub-framework to better fit these types of issues 
which often differed from state to state. As the name suggest the focus on this reform is on 
capital measurements and standards. It is divided into four pillars; Minimum Capital 
Requirements, Risk Weighting, A Target Standard Ratio and Transitional and Implement 
Agreements. 
 
The first pillar, Minimum Capital Requirements, states what kind of capital that should be 
included in the bank’s reserves and how much of each type the bank is required to hold. These 
types of capital are divided into two tiers. The first tier, Tier 1 capital or core capital, includes 
capital arising from sales of stock and preferred shares (bank equity), and cash reserves. The 
second tier, Tier 2 capital or supplementary capital, includes several types of capital such as 
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holdings of subordinated debt, reserves meant to cover potential loan losses, hybrid 
debt/equity instrument holdings and potential gains from future sales of assets. The Basel I 
require the bank to hold equal amount of tier 1 and 2 capital. 
 
The second pillar, Risk Weighting, regulates the risk-weighting of the bank’s asset, i.e. loan 
book and is divided into of five sub-groups that cover all assets in the balance sheet. The first 
one weights assets at 0 % of the assets value, or as “riskless”, and includes cash hold by bank, 
sovereign debt hold and funded in domestic currency and debt and other claims on OECD 
central governments. The second sub-group is weighted at 20 %, i.e. “low risk” assets, and 
covers assets such as multilateral development bank debt, bank debt produced by OECD 
banks and non-OECD bank debt with maturity of less than 12 months. The third category is 
the “moderate risk” assets and includes only residential mortgages, weighted at 50 %. The 
fourth is thus the “high risk”, weighted at 100 %, covers assets such as claims on the private 
sector, non-OECD bank debt with maturity of more than 12 months and equity assets 
appertained to the bank. The last category is the “variable” one and covers assets from the 
internal public sector, and depending on the central bank these assets can be weighted at 0 %, 
10 %, 20 % or 50 %. 
 
The third pillar, A Target Standard Ratio, defines the minimum requirements needed to 
protect banks in the member states from credit risk and combines the first and second pillar. It 
states that 8 % of the bank’s risk-weighted assets are to be covered by tier 1 and tier 2 capital 
reserves. Further, tier 1 capital must cover 4 % of the bank’s risk-weighted assets. 
The last pillar called Transitional and Implementing Agreements defines the stages in which 
each member state’s central bank is requested to implement strategies in order to supervise 
and control so that the Basel I accords are being fulfilled. 
 
The BCBS member states succeeded in implementing the accord during the 4 years period 
that was planned, except from Japan that was suffering from a financial downturn in the late 
1980’s and was given 4 more years to complete the implementation. So, in 1992 and 1996 
respectively, all BCBS member states fulfilled the requirements stated in Basel I. 
 
However, criticism were raised to this first accord, focusing on the limitations to credit risk 
and the fact that only the G-10 states were included to implement the accord. Further criticism 
was aimed at the banking authority’s inability to translate and expound the accord, aside the 
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wish to implement it quickly which caused the regulators to over-generalize the accord. Due 
to the width of risk weighing, banks were able to elude part of the standards given by the 
accord. For example, as the long-term non-OECD debt is weighted at 100 % and the short-
term non-OECD debt is weighted at only 20 %, there was an incentive to swap long-term 
holdings into a series of short-term holdings. This resulted in, on the paper, a low risk profile 
while in fact the bank faced the same real risk from default in unstable emerging markets. 
2.6 Basel II 
Due to the occurring banking crisis in the 1990’s and the above criticism on the first accord, 
the Basel Committee in 1999 decided to revise the Base I standards. This new accord, 
officially named A Revised Framework on International Convergence of Capital 
Measurements and Capital Standards and unofficially known as Basel II, maintained the 
most of the contents in Basel I but gave the framework more depth and coverage to better deal 
with the risk banks were exposed to and to become accustomed with securitization
1
 of bank 
assets. 
 
Pillar 1 
The first pillar, as before known as Minimum Capital Requirements, created a more sensitive 
measurement in risk weighting in order to eliminate the possibility to bypass the minimum 
capital requirements stated in Basel I. This revised accord now included regulation on assets 
hold by subsidiaries to international active banks, and thus abolished the incentive for banks 
to hide capital in order to indicate less risk taking then the bank really takes, and to measure 
the financial status of the entire business including subsidiaries. 
 
In addition, two alternative approaches were introduced in order to weigh the credit risks, and 
Basel II allowed banks to choose one of the two when calculating their capital requirements. 
The first one, called The Standardized Approach, implied that the credit risk were measured 
in a standardized manner affirmed by market based and authorized rating agencies
2
. These 
measurements now run, for claims on sovereigns, from AAA to AA- (weighted at 0 %), to 
                                                 
1
 The process where the issuer is combining any type of financial assets and sells the new repackaged instrument 
in different tiers to investors. 
 
2
 The committee uses the methodology affirmed by Standard & Poor, but do not express any preferences on this 
specific institution and states that measurements affirmed by any other authorized institution might as well be 
used. 
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below B-(weighted at 150 %). All unrated debts are weighted at 100 %. The below table 
summarizes assessments: 
 
Claims on sovereigns and their central bank 
Credit Assessment AAA 
to AA- 
A+ to 
A- 
BBB+ to 
BBB- 
BB+ to 
B- 
Below 
B- 
Unrated 
Risk weight 0 % 20 % 50 % 100 % 150 % 100 % 
Source: BIS 
 
For claims on banks there now exist two options which the national supervisors are able to 
choose one of and apply on all banks. The first option implies that all banks in a specific 
country will receive a risk weight one category less favorable the one received for claims on 
the sovereign of the specific country. The second option is to receive the risk weight affirmed 
by the external credit agency for the specific bank itself. This option also applies a risk weight 
one category more favorable to claims with a maturity of three months or less, but with a 
minimum of 20 % (BIS, 2006). The below tables summarizes:  
 
Claims on banks, option 1 
Credit Assessment of 
Sovereign 
AAA 
to AA- 
A+ to 
A- 
BBB+ to 
BBB- 
BB+ to 
B- 
Below 
B- 
Unrated 
Risk weight 20 % 50 % 100 % 100 % 150 % 100 % 
Source: BIS 
 
Claims on banks, option 2 
Credit Assessment of Banks AAA 
to AA- 
A+ to 
A- 
BBB+ to 
BBB- 
BB+ to 
B- 
Below 
B- 
Unrated 
Risk weight under option 2 
 
20 % 50 % 50 % 100 % 150 % 50 % 
Risk weight for short-term 
claims under option 2 
20 % 20 % 20 % 50 % 150 % 20 % 
Source: BIS 
 
Further, claims on security firms, subject to regulatory, are treated the same way as banks. 
Claims on corporates, are managed as below: 
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Claims on corporates 
Credit Assessment AAA 
to AA- 
A+ to 
A- 
BBB+ to 
BB- 
Below 
BB- 
Unrated 
Risk weight 20 % 50 % 100 % 150 % 100 % 
Source: BIS 
 
The second approach, the Internal Rating Based Approach (IRB), encourage banks to create 
their own risk weighting system, with help from regulators, by increase the required risk 
weighted reserves by 6 %if the bank chooses to apply the Standardized Approach. Only banks 
that have received approval from supervisory agencies are allowed to use their own internal 
risk weighting system. IRB is divided into two different methods, Foundation IRB (FIRB) 
and Advanced IRB (AIRB). FIRB allows approved banks to create their own risk weighting 
system, but with probabilities of default set by external regulators. AIRB on the other hand 
allow banks themselves to set the specific probability of default for each category of assets. 
Due to complexity the AIRB approach is applicable only to the largest banks. 
 
Basel II was also extended to measure the capital needed to protect banks from operational 
risk, which is defined “as the risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal 
processes, people and systems or from external events” (BIS, 2006). There are three methods 
available and the committee encourages banks to move along these methods as they develop 
more refined operational risk measurement systems. The first, the Basic Indicator Approach 
(BIA), simply states that a bank should hold capital equal to 15 % of its average gross income 
during the last three years. 
 
The next method, called the Standardized Approach, splits the bank into business segments 
which all holds a specific percentage of profits needed in reserves. The percentage amount 
depends on the riskiness in the specific segment, where more risky segments are required to 
hold a higher percentage of profit than less risky ones. The table below shows the distribution 
set by the committee; 
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Operational risk – the Standardized Approach 
Business segment % of profits needed in 
reserves 
Corporate finance 18 % 
Sales & trading 18 % 
Retail banking 12 % 
Commercial banking 15 % 
Settlement 18 % 
Agency services 15 % 
Asset management 12 % 
Retail brokerage 12 % 
Source: BIS 
 
The last method used to protect banks from operational risk is called the Advanced 
Measurement Approach (AMA), and encourage banks to develop their own calculations in 
order to hold sufficient capital. Like the above mentioned IRB method this approach is used 
to incorporate self-surveillance and market discipline into the banking system and thus reduce 
the incitement for banks to elude the regulations (BIS, 2006). 
 
Aside operational risk, banks are required hold sufficient capital in order to protect 
themselves from market risk, defined as “the risk of losses in on and off-balance-sheet 
positions arising from movements in market prices.” (BIS, 2006). The Basel II framework 
separates market risk arising from fixed incomes and market risk arising from equity, 
commodity and exchange in foreign currency. The market risk is then divided then interest 
rate risk and volatility risk. For fixed incomes a method called value at risk (VAR) can be 
used, and implies that banks are able to develop their own capital calculation methods in order 
to protect themselves from interest rate risk and volatility risk. This method goes in line with 
the above mentioned IRB approaches and the Advanced Measurement Approach, and is 
required to be approved by regulators. For banks that not are able to implement the VAR 
method, there are two other methods proposed in Basel II. The first regulates the risk 
weighting for fixed income assets. Further, for interest rate risk, banks are recommended to tie 
the required capital to the maturity of fixed income assets, as the below table; 
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Interest rate risk weightings 
Time to maturity Risk weighting 
1 month or less 0.00 % 
6 month or less 0.70 % 
1 year or less 1.25 % 
4 year or less 2.25 % 
8 year or less 3.75 % 
16 year or less 5.25 % 
20 year or less 7.50 % 
Over 20 years 12.50 % 
Source: BIS 
 
For risk associated to volatility in fixed income assets the risk weighting is affiliated to the 
risk rating in underlying banks assets, and ranges from 0 % for AAA to AA-, to 12 % for 
below B-, while unrated assets are given an 8 % risk weighting. 
 
The other method regulates the risk weighting measurement for other assets than fixed 
income, e.g. equity, commodities, foreign currency and hybrid instruments. In order to rate 
these kinds of assets banks are able to use three different approaches. The Simplified 
Approach rates the bank’s asset by looking into the nature of the asset, maturity, volatility and 
origin and which risk weighting ranges from 2.25 % to 100 %. The Scenario Analysis 
allocates risk weights depending on possible scenarios the specific asset may encounter in its 
market. This approach is more complex than the earlier mentioned Simplified Approach, but 
on the other hand it can be more profitable for banks. The third approach, Internal Model 
Approach (IMA), goes in line with VAR and IRB and encourages banks to create their own 
market risk calculation model. 
 
Pillar 2 
The second pillar, Supervisory Review Process, strengthen the position of the regulators and 
increase the regulator – bank interaction. The position of the regulators are strengthened by 
giving them authority to look into banks internal risk calculation methods and, if necessary, 
change them to more conservative, standardized approaches. The regulators mandate to 
penalize is also increased in Basel II, e.g. when banks fail to report their risk calculation 
management. If the regulator suspects the bank to bypass the capital requirements it is also 
allowed to claim that the bank creates an additional buffer capital. The last change in the 
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supervisory process aims to avoid severe crisis by giving regulators mandate to stipulate 
action much earlier than before if the capital reserves fall below minimum requirements. 
 
Pillar 3 
The third pillar, Market Discipline, suggest banks to publish their capital and risk-taking 
positions so that it is available to the general public instead of just the regulators as before. 
Recommended positions is, e.g. the aggregated amount of both Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital, 
reserve requirements for credit, both operational and market risk, risk-weighted capital 
adequacy ratios. The committee’s aim with this is to increase the shareholders influence on 
banks in such way that if a bank takes on too much risk relative their reserves shareholders 
will penalize it. 
3 The way to Basel III 
3.1 The financial crisis of 2007-2008 
Before we analyze the Basel III accord and all that comes along with this, it is necessary to 
get a quick review of the crisis of 2007-2008, which clearly showed the regulators and the 
financial industry that weaknesses existed in the system. We know that the financial crisis of 
2007-2008 is not an uncomplicated issue. Due to limitations of this paper it is impossible to 
include all of the intricate situations and problems that caused the crisis, but we will aim to 
provide information on the key issues for the crisis in order to clarify the origin of the Basel 
III accord. 
 
In the years that lead up to the financial crisis the markets where characterized by economic 
growth and large credit expansion. Even though the Basel II accord existed it could not 
prevent the crisis. One main problem of the Basel II was that it allowed banks and other 
financial organizations to get around the framework by using shadow banking. This initially 
created high yields for the banks but was also leading to a greater interconnection between 
parties on the financial markets. 
 
The origin of the financial crisis of 2007-2008 can be derived back to the situation that existed 
in the US financial market. There was an optimism regarding the housing prices which later 
were leading up to the crash on the housing market. This optimistic view on the housing 
market was combined with the subprime-loans that were performed by the investment banks 
in combination with the institutions Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae. But in 2006 the US market 
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experienced an economic downturn that resulted in a lowered employment rate, falls in 
housing prices and salaries that did not increased as predicted. These factors caused the home 
loan market to collapse and this spread on to other financial markets, sectors and nations. 
Since the subprime loans was given by the investment banks to individuals that not had been 
able to obtain mortgages and other credits without these form of loans, the investment banks 
was facing massive credit losses. The confidence towards these investment banks and the 
Shadow banking system that they were operating through was now badly damaged. The 
money mutual funds (MMF) and the repo funds that were used as funding in these situations 
collapsed, which in turn lead to a bank panic in the shadow banking system. This was 
followed by a situation where the trade for bonds and derivatives stopped. 
 
Since the Shadow banking system is dependent on repo-loans and in order to obtain these 
fundings the entities inside the system had to emit bonds as securities. These bonds were too 
small in order to cover the obligations that the investment banks had towards its lenders. With 
a shortage of high quality collaterals the system did not obtain more funding. In order to cover 
their positions the investment banks had to sell of stocks in order to obtain cash. FED was 
lending out liquidity that stopped the crisis but the financial markets are still suffering from 
the real effects. Compared with the crisis in the 1930´s which can be seen as a crisis where 
there was a flight to currency, the crisis in 2007-2008 can be seen as a crisis where there was a 
flight to quality, such as liquidity, government bonds and cash. 
 
Basel II did not manage to regulate the financial risks taken by the companies which lead to a 
situation where increased risk-taking was rewarded with possibilities of large earnings. Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac and the creation of housing sub-prime loans, combined with the credit 
rating institutions and their failure to rate assets and loans correctly, creating further problems 
during the origin of the crisis. If we look at the interest rates in America during this time it can 
be concluded that they were extremely low, this in combination with low risk premiums and 
low volatility, increased the society’s general desire to invest which created a situation where 
individuals obtained credit to invest in assets such as housing, shares, obligations etc. 
Regarding the capital ratios in the Basel II accord which where to low in order for them to 
work effectively, and the pro-cyclical regulations that were comprised in the accord, made it 
favorable for the banks to hold low levels of quality capital when the economy was in a boom 
(Wissén & Wissén, 2011). 
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It is also hard to create regulations that can be applied to globally. This means that if one 
country implements a type of regulation there is a possibility that the capital mitigates to 
sovereigns or areas where this type of regulation does not exist, a problem which the Basel II 
framework did not regulated. For example, neither hedge funds or  structured investment 
vehicles
3
 (SIV) were regulated by the Basel II and investment banks was only partially 
included in the framework. This resulted in a situation where unregulated business took on the 
role of regulated organizations, which gave business banks opportunities to pass on some of 
their operations to the so called shadow banking system. By doing so the bank increased the 
level of integration between organizations on the financial markets, which amped up the 
systemic risk in the financial system and later caused bank runs on a number of levels. A 
factor that could be seen as a reason for speeding up the bank runs was products such as 
Credit Default Swaps
4
 (CDS). 
 
The reasons for the CDS´s impact on the financial crises are many but the problems 
surrounding this type of asset was mainly that AAA ratings was given to assets that faced 
massive losses. It can also be stated that the over the counter (OTC) trade of the CDS´s was 
too unregulated and actually contributed to the situation where buyers of these assets could 
manipulate it. By manipulating the market the investors could make some of the institutions 
on the market to appear weaker than they actually were and therefore being a threat to the 
economy and therefore amping up the demand for CDS´s. Finally, the situation that existed in 
the years of the financial crisis was the enlarged systemic risk that the trade contributed to. 
This since the trade increased the interconnection on the financial markets (Schultz, 2009). 
 
During the pre-crisis period banks were focusing on creating shareholder value. This resulted 
in increased risk-taking since shareholder value is created by giving the shareholder large 
profits through dividends. The new demand for dividends created incentives for the financial 
institutions to implement bonus-systems for their employees to take on more risk than 
allowed to maximize shareholder return. 
 
All these aspects led to the financial crisis 2008 but the main issue that led up to the crisis was 
the systemic risk that had been built up inside the financial system. It was not the sub-prime 
                                                 
3
 A combination of investment assets that profits from credit spreads between short-term debt and long-term 
structured finance products. 
4
 A swap designed to transfer the credit exposure of fixed income products between parties. 
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loans or the shadow banking per se that sank the financial system, but rather a combination of 
large systemic risk and bank-panics. 
3.2 The shadow banking system 
The shadow banking did not affect the Swedish market and does not exist to a large extent on 
the Swedish market. Its parties are to a certain extent affected due to issues that will be 
introduced later on in the paper, but due to the shadow banking system significance when 
discussing the issues behind the financial crisis as a whole we have decided to incorporate this 
section in our paper. 
 
During the financial crisis in 2008 and under its aftermath it became clear that the financial 
markets where severally affected by the role that the shadow banking had and that the 
interconnection between the regular banks and the shadow banking system where much 
greater than what the authorities thought. 
 
Shadow banking is not the same as commercial banking activities. In commercial banks the 
borrowers and lenders meet at the same place with a common intermediary. This is not the 
same in the shadow banking system. In the shadow banking system the borrowers and lenders 
do not interact in this way. The shadow banking system is built up by several different entities 
that are conducting different parts of the business, parts that normally is conducted under the 
same roof in a commercial bank (Adrian, et al., 2010). The shadow banking can be done by 
one company or several companies that works together. And to be able to call the activity 
shadow banking it has to take place outside the normal banking system (FSB, 2011). Shadow 
banking system is not conducting the fund raising in the same way that funds are raised in the 
normal banking system. Where the commercial bank raises funds by functioning as a 
intermediary between lenders and borrowers. Since the shadow banking system is based 
around many non-banking companies this form of obtaining funds is not possible. Instead the 
shadow banking system obtains its funds by issuing short-term company treasury bonds to 
private companies and savers (Adrian, et al., 2010). 
    
In 2007 just before the outbreak of the crisis the shadow banking system was, in terms of 
liabilities, larger than the commercial banking sector; liabilities worth USD 22 trillion were 
held by the shadow banking system compared to USD 14 trillion held by the commercial 
banking system. When trying to describe the shadow banking system it is necessary to see 
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that the system is built up around many entities that play different roles within the credit 
process. The system can be divided into three main groups (Adrian, et al., 2010): 
 
Government sponsored shadow banking sub-system 
This part of the shadow banking system comes from the reforms that where implemented in 
the US in the 1930´s. Types of shadow banking entities that are included in this section are 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. These are called Government Sponsored Enterprises (GSE). 
When looking at commercial banks the funding originates from the possibility for the bank to 
be the holder of deposits. This is not the case with the GSE’s. Their business is instead 
depending on that there exist a credit to maturity mismatch in the financial system. The GSE’s 
are issuing short and long term debt securities on the market. By considering these facts it is 
not possible for the GSE’s to have the same working pattern as a commercial bank. Instead, 
when taking a closer look at these entities it has shown that the companies are building their 
business around an interconnection between several parts within the GSE system (Adrian, et 
al., 2010). 
 
One of the largest changes in the banking system has been evolving over the last 30 years. 
This is the change from earlier operations based on low return on equity (ROE) towards the 
new system of high ROE. These changes has caused the modern banking to be more market 
risk intensive, fee based, less credit risk intensive and whole sale funded than before. Since 
the system has changed there was a demand created for a new type of asset management. This 
new system made the transition towards increased lending even though the inflow of capital 
has been considerably reduced. 
This type of operations magnifies the ROE for the banks and the holding companies. 
Operations such as these have led to new approaches regarding the funding and management 
of risks, compared with how the earlier banks worked. This can be described as follows: 
 
 Financial Holding Companies (FHC) creates loans in the banks affiliate. This is a 
whole sale funded operation conducted in the whole sale funding markets and the 
liquidity comes from the bank. Warehousing and accumulation of loans then becomes 
an off-balance operation handled by the affiliate broker dealer. 
 The securitization of loans occurs when the affiliation transfer the loans into a 
Structured Investment Vehicle (SIV) that is bankruptcy remoted. 
 Operations such the one above is central when funding the safest structured assets for 
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credits in the off-balance sheet Asset Backed Securities (ABS). The ABS is then 
managed by the subsidiary and this becomes backstopped by the investment bank. 
 
This has become the leading way of how the lending has been conducted in the US. There has 
been a transition from the business banks towards shadow banking, increasing the impact on 
the market and mortgages. Now shadow banks, asset managers, and broker dealers are the 
largest groups involved with creation of credits. These are all components in the FHC and 
funded by the American and global capital markets. The impact of this has not only been 
negative it has also led to a capital efficient lending characterised by high ROE, higher fees, a 
larger amount of ABS investors and structurers. This transformation, due to the diversification 
by investment banks/ holding companies the banking system should become more stable since 
these types of companies can retain revenues not only from their banking operations (Adrian, 
et al., 2010). 
 
The shadow banking system has played a significant role in the structural problems that led to 
the financial crisis of 2008 (Adrian, et al., 2010). This has resulted in new backstops created 
initially when Lehman Brothers defaulted, which in turn created the need for the Federal 
Reserve to overlook and control the different parts of the shadow banking system. There is 
hard to control the systemic risk within the system but it is necessary in order to prevent 
future crisis. This problem of the systemic risk could be dealt with by excessive monitoring 
and new regulations, but it is not clear that this will be possible due to the complexity of the 
shadow banking system (FSB, 2011). 
4 Basel III 
4.1 Main purposes 
According to BCBS, the objectives of Basel III is to strengthen global capital and liquidity 
regulations with the goal of promoting a more resilient banking industry; and to improve the 
banking sector’s ability to absorb financial and economic shocks and prevent spillover of such 
shocks to real economy. 
 
The Basel III framework will be binding and imposed in all of the countries that together 
compose the BCBS. These are representatives from each of the 27 nations that are members 
in the committee. All representatives are individuals either working in central-banks or 
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national regulating authorities. Members of the BCBS (Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, 
Canada, China, France, Germany, Hong Kong SAR, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Korea, 
Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States) (BIS, 2010a). 
4.2 Time table 
When developing the Basel III the BCBS has settled a time table for the imposition of the 
framework. These directions shall be followed by all of the members although differences can 
occur for nations which are non-members as well as for members. BCBS timetable for 
introduction of the different regulations shall work as guidelines. All of the regulations should 
be in use in 2019, and initiated by the 1/1-2013 (BIS, 2010a) 
4.3 Framework 
Basel III uses Basel II as a base and has been adjusted to better handle types of crisis as seen 
in 2008. It uses the same basic structure as the earlier framework but imposes harder 
regulations on minimum capital requirements and liquidity requirements. 
 
4.3.1 Pillar 1 
The first pillar, Enlarged minimum capital requirements and liquidity requirements, is 
regulating the minimal capital requirements which shall be followed by the regulated parties. 
When overlooking the different changes in the new framework it becomes clear that there is a 
focus on increased capital control. Changes in the pillar 1 in Basel III compared with the 
earlier frameworks Basel I and II are: 
 
 The common equity needs to be 4.5 % of the risk-weighted assets. 
 Total amount of Tier 1 capital has to be as a minimum 6% of the risk-weighted 
assets. 
 The total sum of Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital must be 8% of the risk-weighted assets. 
 
In Basel III the Tier 1 capital is divided into 2 subparts, Common equity Tier 1 capital and 
additional Tier 1 capital. The common equity Tier 1 capital shall according to the BCBS be 
consisting of common equity, a capital conservation buffer, countercyclical buffer and a 
systemic addition for financial institutions (BIS, 2010a) 
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Common equity 
Common equity has the same meaning as in Basel II but is now raised to a new minimum 
level of 4,5% of risk weighted assets. 
The common equity consists of: 
 
 Retained earnings 
 Common shares that has been issued by the bank. 
 Surpluses that come from issuing shares that classifies as Tier 1 capital. 
 Common shares that is issued by subsidiaries 
 Adjustments that comes from regulatory calculations of Tier 1 capital. 
(BIS, 2010a) 
Capital conservational buffer 
This is an addition to the Basel II framework that has been implied in Basel III. This part of 
the Tier 1 capital consists of funding that has been obtain in periods without financial stress 
and shall work as financial reserves under periods of crisis or financial stress. The banks shall 
hold buffers and increase this buffer over all time-periods lacking financial stress. When the 
buffer is depleted the banks shall find ways of rebalance their assets so that the buffer can be 
reconstructed. In the Basel III it is stated that the capital conservational buffer shall be 2,5% 
above the minimal tier 1 capital requirements. The buffer shall consist of common equity 
(BIS, 2010a). Banks will have to face different ratios when the capital is falling below 
different ratios of tier 1 capital, as shown below; 
 
Individual bank minimum capital conservation standards 
Common Equity Tier 1 Ratio Minimum Capital Conservation 
Ratios (expressed as % of yearly 
earnings) 
4.5 % -  5.125 %   100 % 
>5.125 % - 5.75 % 80% 
>5.75 % - 6.375 % 60% 
>6.375 %  - 7.0 % 40% 
> 7.0 %                                                0% 
Source: BCBS 
 
Countercyclical buffer 
This subpart of the Tier 1 capital is tended to work as a defense against system wide stress. 
This means that the banks shall build up enough money in reserves to sustain during times 
where the macroeconomic climate puts financial pressure on the markets. This shall primarily 
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be a buffer that is constructed for preventing future losses rather than losses that can be 
actualized in the present, while the acquired level of this is much vaguer than the limit for the 
conservational buffer. Since this buffer is required to meet macroeconomic changes and 
therefore depends on the economic climates in the actual country that the bank is conducting 
its operations. Due to this, the size of this buffer is determined by the national agencies when 
analyzing the economic situation and the size of the credit volume existing in the actual 
country. The size of the countercyclical buffer shall therefore according to the Basel III lie 
within the range of 0-2.5% depending on the macroeconomic situation of the nation.    
 
Systematical addition 
The systematical addition to the Tier 1 capital will be applied to banks that is so large that 
they has a fundamental impact on global and national financial markets. This capital will be 
regulated depending on the banks size and how well it is connected to other financial actors 
and markets. The earlier criteria´s will be looked upon when deciding how large the additional 
capital shall be but it will most likely be within the range of 1-2.5 %. 
 
Additional Tier 1 capital 
This form of capital is capital that shall be a complement to the Tier 1 capital that consists of 
common equity. Additional tier 1 capital is therefore built up by capital from in Basel II this 
capital could be 2% of Tier 1 capital but with the Basel III this is restricted to be 1.5 % (BIS, 
2010a). When analyzing the quality of the capital that is included in the Tier 1 additional 
capital, there is no large difference in the quality of the capital between this capital and the 
common equity Tier 1 capital. The largest difference for the additional tier 1 capital is that this 
capital has no maturity date upon issuing date. If necessary the bank can buy back these 
instruments after a time-period of 5 years. But this operation can only be conducted if the 
supervisory authorities allow it. 
 
Tier 2 capital 
Apart from the tier 1 capital the new capital requirements also comprise the tier 2 capital. This 
capital shall be used to absorb losses on a gone concern basis. Tier 2 capital shall be the 
capital that is used if the bank should face threats of liquidation, or when the bank applies for 
the same. The ratio of Tier 2 capital is 2 % in Basel III framework (BIS, 2010a). 
 
Instruments that is included in Tier 2 capital has a minimum maturity of five years and can be 
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redeemed but this action need, as for the additional tier 1 capital, to be authorized by the 
national supervisory organ (BIS, 2010a). 
 
There are many types of capital that qualifies into the category of Tier 2 capital, e.g. stock 
surpluses that earlier was possible to incorporate into Tier 1 capital and Provisions that are 
held as general loss-loan reserves. These assets should be valued used the standardized 
approach to credit risk. This approach is the same as the approach that we have shown in the 
Basel II section (BIS, 2010a). 
 
The second part of Pillar 1 is treating the problems with risk coverage and how the banks 
shall deal with the risk that they faces when conducting their operations. Basel III outlines 
three specific risks that the framework shall be regulating; credit risk, operational risk, market 
risk. 
 
Credit Risk 
Credit risk is defined as risk that occurs when a counterpart can´t fulfill the obligation it has 
against the bank. Exposure to these types of risk can lead to severe financial damages to banks 
in times of financial stress, such as the previous crisis. 
 
According to the frameworks of both Basel II and III the bank needs to use one of two 
methods to evaluate their exposure to credit risk, again The Standardized Approach or The 
Internal Ratings Based Approach. Which one of the methods the bank shall use is decided by 
the supervising organ for each nation. This is the same regulations as we discuss earlier in the 
section of Basel II. 
 
Using one of these methods the bank has classified the credit risk for their counter-parties. A 
new element of the Basel III framework is the stress-test that shall be conducted for these 
types of assets. This is referred to as Expected Positive Exposure (EPE). EPE means that 
banks shall perform stress-test by using three years of both historical market data and market 
data from the current market. When using the historical data the bank needs to use three years 
of back-dated data. In addition to this requirement the data needs to be from periods of 
financial stress. Banking institutions needs to be able to constantly show that the tested assets 
have been looked upon in times of stress and that it occurs with times of higher credit spreads 
or Credit Default Swaps (CDS). A Credit Default Swap is a form of insurance between 
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parties. The contract has the purpose of eliminating risk of default of one company. It means 
that the holder of the swap is making payments on a regular basis to the seller as long as the 
contract has not passed its maturity date. In exchange the seller agrees to pay out an amount 
of money if the default of the company occurs (Hull, 2011). Credit spreads can for example 
include trades of loan spreads or bond spreads. This shall be done for a sample of 
counterparties with whom the bank has conducted trades of credit spreads. Each of these 
parties should also have been categorized using the IRB approach or the standardized 
approach (BIS, 2010a). 
   
Operational risk 
The procedure of dealing with operational risk in Basel III is similar to the framework of 
Basel II. Operational risk is defined in the Basel frameworks as: “the risk of loss resulting 
from inadequate or failed internal processes, people and systems or from external events.” 
(BIS, 2006) 
 
The methods used for calculating and evaluating the operational risk involve the BIA, 
standardized approach, and the AMA. All of these models are discussed by us in the part of 
Basel II. 
 
Market Risk 
For the Basel III framework the BCBS recommends the same approach towards the market 
risk as the previous framework of Basel II. This means that the valuation of the market risk 
should be divided into risk from fixed incomes and market risk from commodities. The VAR 
approach should still be used for fixed incomes as in line with the Basel II accord. 
 
Another component of pillar 1 which is new in the Basel III accord is the enhanced leverage 
ratio. This leverage ratio is necessary according to the BCBS since: 
 
“One of the underlying features of the crisis was the build-up of excessive on- and off-
balance sheet leverage in the banking system. In many cases, banks built up excessive 
leverage while still showing strong risk based capital ratios. During the most severe 
part of the crisis, the banking sector was forced by the market to reduce its leverage in a 
manner that amplified downward pressure on asset prices, further exacerbating the 
positive feedback loop between losses, declines in bank capital, and contraction in 
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credit availability.” 
(BIS, 2010a) 
  
This new leverage ratio is introduced into the framework in order to prevent the build up of 
high levels of leverage that can be harmful, not only to individual banks but to the financial 
system as a whole. Another reason for the introduction of the leverage ratio is the intended 
effect of the leverage ratio to work as a backstop measure. The leverage ratio for the Tier 1 
capital is set to 3% by the BCBS. All of the new leverage ratios is based on the specific 
regulations regarding the Tier 1 capital from the Basel III accord. 
 
To be able to see the effect on the banks exposure, this shall be done by the process of 
accounting measurement approach. This type of measurement can be divided into 2 parts. On-
balance sheet items and off-balance sheet items. On balance sheet items are items such as 
derivatives and Securities Financing Transactions (SFT) (BIS, 2010a) 
 
SFT are according to the Basel III agreement a secure form of financing. Due to this fact it is 
conducted as an important item on the accounting measures that are included in the leverage 
measurements of the bank. 
 
4.3.2 Pillar 2 
The second pillar of the Basel III framework follows mainly the same pattern as the Pillar 2 in 
Basel II but with enhanced requirements regarding the supervisory review of the process for 
firm wide risk management and capital planning (Moody's, 2012). The second pillar in Basel 
II aims to increase the bank’s ability to overlook their operations and increase their coverage 
of internal capital assessments (BIS, 2006). 
 
Changes to the second pillar in Basel III compared to Basel II 
In the Basel III accord it is stated that the pillar 2 should have assets so that they surpass the 
minimum requirements of assets in Pillar 1. Regarding the supervisory responsibility the 
management should be aiming to recognise all the risks the bank is facing conducting its 
operations. A central component in the second pillar of Basel II & III is the internal capital 
adequacy assessment process (ICAAP). This form of supervisory process is necessary for the 
bank in order to prevent the situations of risk-exposure that was causing damage to the 
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markets in the financial crisis of 2008 (BIS, 2009) 
 
The supervisory requirements of Basel III aim to manage some specific risks or topics. 
Some of these topics are; risk concentrations, off-balance sheet exposures with a focus on 
securitization, reputational risk and implicit support, valuation and liquidity risks and sound 
stress testing practices. 
 
Pillar 2 also aims to creating a sound management of the firm-wide risk. Sound firm-wide risk 
can be accomplished by an Active Board and Senior Management Oversight that is strengthen 
by giving the board and senior managers of the bank responsibilities for the risk of the 
operations conducted. This by identifying risks and make sure that the identified risk is 
accompanied by a limitations that will reduce the banks losses if a potential situation occurs. 
But the management of risk shall not only be limited to the risk that the market puts on the 
company but to include all of the risks that the bank faces. Another crucial aspect of this 
regulation is that the board and management of the bank shall be familiar with all of the 
business lines operated by the company. They shall have enough qualifications so that they 
can assess the financial markets and the risk associated with these types of markets and 
operations (BIS, 2009). 
 
4.3.3 Pillar 3 
The third pillar of the Basel III is built on the same framework as its predecessor Basel II. 
When looking at the third pillar it has the goal of creating a more resilient market discipline 
for the financial industry. Pillar 3 has the purpose of creating an environment where the 
banking industry should take less risk and become more overt. This by provide correct 
information to the market participants about the risk-exposure of the bank and the 
measurements used in order to obtain these measurements. In order to follow the Basel III 
accord banks shall provide enough information to their shareholders as well as public 
information. This in order to ensure that the bank has published enough information to enable 
that prepared decisions is made with the risk-exposure in mind (BIS, 2008). 
 
The bank needs to provide the market with information regarding its disclosures yearly or 
more frequent. Information regarding the disclosure shall also be available in a document, if 
the information not is available in a specific document it is accepted that the bank shows 
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where the information can be acquired. Supervising organizations can also demand that the 
bank provides this type of information in table form in order to give a clearer picture of the 
banks situation  (BIS, 2011). 
 
4.3.4 Liquidity Standards 
A new important part of the Basel III accord concerns the liquidity and the liquidity coverage 
ratio (LCR). The LCR is introduced into the Basel III in an attempt to increase the resiliency 
of the banking sector (BIS, 2013). 
 
LCR is included with the purpose of decrease the banks short-term liquidity risk and the 
short-term liquidity risk profile of the bank. This is done by making sure that the bank has 
enough unencumbered high-quality liquid assets (HQLA). HQLA is defined as assets that can 
be easily transformed into cash. This since the Basel III states that banks shall have enough 
HQLA to be able to persevere a 30 day long liquidity stress-test (BIS, 2013c). This shall 
strengthen the banks possibilities to endure arising problems that involves liquidity stress 
regardless of the source of this stress and decrease the possibility of the economic shock to 
spread into the real economy. 
 
By implementing the LCR the main objective is to make sure that the banks as entities has 
enough HQLA to cover their risk-exposure. An additional objective of the LCR is to create 
long-term stable funding and incentives for the financial sector to create resiliency by funding 
their activities with stable sources of funding. This with the supplementary requirements of 
the NSFR
5
 which states that the bank shall be able to survive for a year; the LCR shall be a 
way to create a more stable banking sector (BIS, 2013) 
 
BCBS has developed a time table for the implementation of the LCR which starts in January 
2015 and shall be finished in January 2019. The requirement and time table is shown in the 
below table; 
 
 
                                                 
5
 “The NSFR requires a minimum amount of stable sources of funding at a bank relative to the liquidity profiles 
of the assets, as well as the potential for contingent liquidity needs arising from off-balance sheet commitments, 
over a one-year horizon. The NSFR aims to limit over-reliance on short-term wholesale funding during times of 
buoyant market liquidity and encourage better assessment of liquidity risk across all on- and off-balance sheet 
items.” (BIS, 2013) 
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LCR requirement time table 
 January 2015 January 2016 January 2017 January 2018 January 2019 
Minimum LCR 60 % 70 % 80 % 90 % 100 % 
Source: BIS 
 
When a bank is exposed to financial stress it has to use its HQLA in order to maintain a LCR 
of 100%. This leads to a fall in HQLA below 100%, which can be negative for the bank 
implying that such situations should be addressed by supervisors (BIS, 2013). 
 
Decisions regarding the use of the HQLA the supervisors needs to, according to the BCBS, 
take some questions in consideration. Among these some are: address the crisis leading to a 
use of HQLA in an early stage, different actions towards a LCR below 100% can be taken 
with respect to the situation, and the actions taken shall be evaluated depending on the 
specific situation regarding the market and the firm specific conditions. If banks want to use 
their HQLA to recover their LCR, HQLA can be used both for systemic risk and idiosyncratic 
risk but these cases can be addressed differently (BIS, 2013). 
 
The LCR is consisting of the HQLA stock and its value during stressed times and the total net 
cash outflow. How LCR is calculated is shown below: 
 
     
    
                      
      
 
Total Net Cash Outflow 
The second component of the LCR is the Total Net Cash Outflow. This is defined as the total 
expected cash outflow minus total expected cash inflows during a specific one month period 
(BIS, 2013). The cash outflow in the liquidity standards of Basel III is divided into several 
parts of funding. These subparts can be described as different deposits from different types of 
clients some examples are: retail deposits
6
, wholesale funding
7
, and secure funding
8
. These 
                                                 
6
 Deposits from “normal clients” such as private individuals. The retail deposits can be divided into stable 
deposits and less-stable deposits. Stable deposits will have a run-off rate of 5% where the less-stable will face 
such a rate of 10%. The difference between the stable and less-stable deposits is that the stable funds are 
guaranteed by public guarantees or insurance schemes (BIS, 2013) 
 
7
 Funding that comes from companies or other organisations. This type of funding can be divided into unsecured 
and secured wholesale funding. Unsecured wholesale funding is in a large extent consisting of commercial 
papers. The run-off rates for these types of deposits are much higher than for the retail deposits (BIS, 2013). 
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are all assigned a individual run-off rate, which is incorporated in the liquidity framework as a 
way of simulating periods of financial stress. The rate should be interpreted as the funding 
that will mature in a one-month period of economic stress that will not go away. 
 
Cash inflow 
The cash inflow for the bank shall only be calculated from contractual capital inflows and 
which a little risk of default over a one month period. To make the banks less dependent on 
anticipated incomes the Basel III liquidity standards states that the bank needs to have a 
minimum of 25% of HQLA in relation to the expected capital cash outflow. 
 
The cash inflow can come from sources such as committed facilities, retail and business 
customer inflows, operational deposits and are monitored in the Basel III liquidity accord in 
order to ensure stable liquidity. For example loans that are being issued by the bank over a 
one-month period of high financial stress shall be 50% of the financial inflow from the retail 
and small businesses. This means that the contractual inflow is 50% of the contractual 
amount. When looking at the inflows from wholesale funding the inflow percentage is 100% 
for counter-parties such as central banks and a rate of 50% for counter-parties that are 
considered to be non-financial. 
4.4 Major areas of disagreement 
As with any accord or proposal made in the society it is hard to get everyone to comply with 
it or like it. This is the same for the Basel III accord, where there exists disagreement between 
the BCBS as regulatory party and the banking industry. 
 
The largest areas of disagreement concerns the costs for the industry, where the banks claims 
that the costs aligned with implying Basel III are unnecessary high, which most probably will 
lead to higher costs for their customers. Industry parties have pointed out some areas where 
the industry does not agree with the BCBS regarding the level of regulations (Elliot, 2010). 
We are aware of, and stress that, not all banks, bank managers and industry parties share this 
pessimistic view of the framework and that there in fact is a large number of such parties and 
individuals that support and sympathize with the Basel regulations. 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
8
 Funding that comes from assets that are collateralised and therefore assigned with legal rights towards the 
counterparts in case of default or insolvency. Due to the nature of these securities it has been given a run-off rate 
of 25% (BIS, 2013). 
30 
 
In Basel III there is a requirement that states that the capital ratios should be higher than in the 
Basel II, this is a change that the industry does not like and considers to be unnecessary high. 
Regarding liquidity, market actors are afraid that the imposition of the NSFR can be costly 
since it puts pressure on the self-funding of the bank and how it allocates its assets (Elliot, 
2010). In Basel III the banks will also need to comply with a new leverage ratio. This leverage 
ratio can force European banks to act more like American banks. According to critics this is 
due to the fact that the European banks are more prone to focus on low risk assets than its 
American equivalents. But since this will impose costs on the banks it is also the main reason 
for the disagreement regarding the Basel III. 
 
Other areas where the banks are less positive than the BCBS is regarding the common equity 
that shall be included in tier 1 capital. All parties recognize the common equity as the safest 
type of capital, the problem according to the financial agents are that this form of capital also 
is the most expensive capital to raise (Elliot, 2010). 
 
All the disagreements are mainly due to the costs of implementing the Basel III. Of course no 
one operating on the financial markets likes the higher cost this will bring to their operations. 
But this is in fact the purpose of the Basel III accord, and it has to be taken into consideration 
that the costs have to increase in order for banks to act more responsible. So the different 
views that the parties has on Basel III has to be looked at with the real purpose of the accord 
in mind. The real question is not if it would bring costs to the banks operations and the 
financial industry but rather if these costs will be enough in order to offset bad financial 
decisions and make the banks less keen on undertaking large risks. 
5 Basel III impacts 
5.1 Impacts on the Swedish banking system 
When examine the Basel III effects on Swedish banks it is important not to isolate specific 
banks but rather look at the system as a whole, from a so called general equilibrium (GE) 
perspective. The impacts of Basel III on Swedish banks, we will further look into, is primarily 
costs associated with the new capital requirements and liquidity and the Basel III ability to 
bring stability to the Swedish banking system. 
 
31 
 
5.1.1 The cost impact 
Both academic studies and regulatory studies show that banks will, and are needed, to 
substitute equity for debt when facing the capital requirements. When examine the effect on 
the costs associated with Basel III the main approach in other academic studies is to use the 
concept of total cost of capital (TCOC)
9
, and further, as Jaffee and Walden (2010), to use the 
Modigliani-Miller (MM) theory. The MM theory states that a bank’s TCOC is independent of 
the mix of equity and debt in the capital mix. The cost of capital is instead determined of the 
riskiness of the business. There is no doubt about that equity is more expensive than debt, but 
as the share of equity increases each unit of equity and debt holds less risk. Thus, as banks 
swaps equity for debt the TCOC remains unchanged. Apart from this theory that implies that 
Basel III would have almost no impact on TCOC, Jaffee and Walden (2010) present a number 
of other theories that may interfere with this view; 
 
The tax shield 
As dividends paid on equity shares is not tax deductible while interest paid on debt is there is 
a tax shield available and this may encourage banks to hold more debt as capital. The capital 
requirements proposed in Basel III and the following equity for debt swap may therefore 
decrease the utility of this tax shield and thus increase the TCOC. However, Jaffee and 
Walden argue that this impact will be relatively small. 
 
New equity and asymmetric information 
The cost of equity, and creation of new equity from emissions, can increase if it signals to the 
market that the outlook for future profits is worse than previously stated, and implying that 
the ones that decide on emissions have asymmetric information. How serious this impact will 
be depends on the markets general view on the specific bank, and could be quite serious and 
costs quite high if the bank is recognized as unstable with unsound financial status. Again, as 
Basel III will be implemented on all Swedish banks simultaneously, and the markets 
awareness of this, the impact is estimated to be relatively modest. Jaffee and Walden (2010) 
also states that most of the needed adjustments will be fulfilled through retained earnings, 
which also speaks for small changes in TCOC. 
 
 
                                                 
9
 The weighted average of the debt and equity costs of capital. 
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The value of deposit insurance 
In most of the countries that are implementing the Basel III framework the government 
provides deposit insurance. This insurance is often paid in full by the government which 
implies direct utility to both the banks and their depositors. Since Basel III and its increased 
capital requirements will lower the risk for bankruptcy the deposit insurance will decrease in 
value for banks, which can be viewed as an increase in TCOC. 
 
The debt overhang issue 
The debt overhang issue refers to the fact that if a bank with a high debt to asset ratio finance 
new investments with new capital, the benefit from this investment accrue to the banks debt 
holders, which in turn causes the bank to avoid new investments. This cost, for avoiding 
investments, decreases when banks is required to hold more equity relative to before, and 
therefore this will cause the TCOC to decrease when implementing the new framework. 
The above four theories are academic theories, conducted on an academic level. These 
theories estimate the impacts to be of a minor nature (Jaffee & Walden, 2010).  
 
There are also a number of theories, or studies, conducted on a regulatory level, carried out 
mainly by the Basel Committee. The committee has examined outcomes both for the new 
capital requirements and for the new liquidity requirements, focusing on the two liquidity 
ratios (LCR and NSFR) explained in chapter 4.3. The main aim in these reports is to measure 
the impact of Basel III on a country’s aggregated output. Further, the committee applies both 
the long-term impacts perspective and the transitional period impacts perspective. These 
studies show that the long-term effects and the transitional effects are very analogous, and 
why they can be explained all in one. The approach used in the reports is first to measure the 
impact on lending spreads
10
 and volumes followed from the new capital and liquidity 
requirements, and then to measure the effects on GDP from changes in lending spreads and 
volumes (BIS, 2010b). 
 
The impact on lending spreads from the suggested increase in capital is calculated to be an 
increase of 13 basis points
11
, which will affect TCOC by the same degree. After 4 years of 
transition BCBS estimates the change to be an increase of 16 basis points, and expects no 
further increase. As for impacts due to higher liquidity, i.e. the LCR and NSFR requirements, 
                                                 
10
 The difference between the rate that a bank pays its depositors and the rate that it charges its borrowers. 
11
 1 basis point unit is equal to 1/100
th
 of 1 %, e.g. 0.05 % change is equal to 5 basis points. 
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the committee measures it to be an increase between 14 and 25 basis points on lending 
spreads (BIS, 2010b). 
 
As for the impacts on GDP followed from the above changes in lending spreads the 
committee uses a macroeconomic, general equilibrium, model. The results presented in these 
reports are a decrease in GDP between 0.09 % and 0.10 % for a 1 % increase due to the new 
capital requirements, and a decrease in GDP between 0.08 % and 0.13 % due to the new 
liquidity requirements. Since the capital and liquidity requirements to some extent will 
overlap the committee measures the combined effect to be an increase in GDP between 0.12 
% and 0.16 % (Jaffee & Walden, 2010). 
 
The committee also lists a number of other factors that most probably will create even lower 
values in terms of the calculated impact. First they state monetary policy, and the fact that 
each member country’s central bank has the authority to decrease the repo rate in order to 
avoid increases in lending spreads. The committee also mentions other bank adjustment, and 
includes other actions that banks can execute in order to offset any increases in lending 
spreads, e.g. decrease its operating costs and increase its non-interest income. Finally the 
committee argues that other financial market adjustments also will contribute to lower 
impacts then the one stated above. These adjustments is said to occur from the fact that both 
household and business borrowers will demand new lending channels, e.g. non-bank lenders 
which will arise, and by this borrowers are not obligated to pay the full cost for the Basel III 
implementation and increase in lending spreads (BIS, 2010b). 
 
5.1.2 The systemic risk impact 
 
One of the goals with the Basel III is reducing the systemic risk in the banking sector and 
stabilise the financial systems. Measures that are taken towards this in the Basel III 
framework are higher quality controls of the capital with the Basel III requirement of core 
capital consisting of common stock, and a capital conservation buffer that can be used in 
times of financial stress which can occur when the systemic risk increases. 
 
The new requirements regarding the debt maturity and the liquidity of assets will also help to 
prevent crisis that origins from systemic risk. Debt maturity and asset liquidity are items that 
can lead to financial stress for a bank. This is occurring when the bonds issued by a bank is 
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funded through short-time loans by using commercial papers or repo agreements. The loans 
issued by the banks are rather long term agreements. In Basel III this is dealt with by 
introducing the NSFR, explained in chapter 4.3. According to the framework the NSFR and 
its components of ASF and RSF are significantly reducing the risk that there will be a 
mismatch between the long- and short-term funding for the bank. The liquidity requirements 
in the Basel III shall be regarded as instruments used by the banks so that they can prevent 
future shocks that could arise from the ability to fund the banks legal obligations (Jaffee & 
Walden, 2010). 
 
There are also other actions that can be taken in order to reduce the risks in the banking sector 
that are not included into the framework of the Basel III. In order to give a clearer overview of 
the problems surrounding the risks for the banking sector we have chosen to include these in 
our paper. These actions are; 
 
Create a situation where the bank tries to increase their levels of new capital instead of getting 
rid of existing assets. This since both of these possibilities would allow banks to meet the new 
capital. If banks are using the method of selling of assets to meet the requirements this can 
create difficulties of systemic risk if it is not monitored. 
 
Another way of dealing with the risk the banks could use contingent capital. Contingent 
capital means that the bank is issuing instruments that will be automatically recapitalized if 
periods of financial stress occur. This shall be combined with a strategy of assemble capital in 
good times when the cost of doing so is low. Examples of instruments that fall into this 
category are capital insurance, and reverse convertibles (Acharya, et al., 2010). 
 
The last measure towards reducing risk can be to regulate the Shadow Banking system. 
Shadow banking system played a great role in the previous crisis this since this phenomenon 
increased the systemic risk within the financial system. The problem with this was that banks 
were connected to unregulated financial institutions that experienced liquidity problems and 
from there it was spread to business banks. 
 
Swedish banks are exposed to two major sources of systemic risk according to Jaffe and 
Walden. The primarily exposure for the bank is due to the large amounts of mortgages issued 
by the Swedish banks. Therefore a crisis that results in falling prices on housing will be costly 
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for the banks and have an effect on the financial industry as a whole. With this in mind a 
shock occurring on either the housing market or in the banking sector could easily led to a 
situation like the financial crisis in the 1990. Swedish banks does are also holding a 
proportionally larger amount of mortgages than banks in other countries.   
 
The second important exposure towards systemic risk for the Swedish banks comes from the 
fact that Sweden is a small open economy. Therefore it is likely that the markets will be 
affected by events or crisis occurring in other economies. 
 
A requirement in Basel III that is of great importance regarding mortgages is especially the 
Required Stable Funding Factor (RSF) which is an amendment in the Basel III NSFR. The 
RSF for mortgages has been lowered from 100% in early stages, to 65% in Basel III. 
Regarding the mortgages held by the Swedish banks it can be concluded that the loans issued 
are of high quality. With high quality loans a possible scenario is that banks rather use covered 
bonds instead of securitisation, which is allowed in Basel III, in order to obtain funding for 
their mortgages. Even though the use of securitisation could be beneficial for the banks since 
it makes it possible to remove the mortgages from the balance sheets of the bank (Jaffee & 
Walden, 2010). This could seem strange since the Swedish banks are holding large items of 
mortgages on their balance sheets. This shall not be causing large concerns for the banks since 
high quality loans can be backing up covered bond issuance. 
 
The situation of the Swedish banks shall not only be seen as good in the aspect of high quality 
loans. When looking at the increasing values on the Swedish market of housing and real estate 
this can create a possible real-estate bubble. This situation is not dealt with in the framework 
in Basel III. Instead to prevent a situation like this from causing damage to the nations GDP 
and the financial system it is important that the national regulators monitors the housing 
market carefully and intervenes when the risk of a bubble bursting increases. 
 
Analysing the systemic risk of the Swedish banks Jaffe and Walden concludes that the Basel 
III takes care of many aspects of the systemic risk. But the two sources mentioned above will 
be the two exposures that are hardest to regulate. It can also be the case that the costs of 
implementing measures towards a decreased systemic risk can be higher than the intended 
benefits from the implementation of these measures (Jaffee & Walden, 2010). 
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Even though Basel III takes steps towards regulating systemic risk there are many types of 
this risk which the accord does not regulate. This could cause problems later on if not taken 
into consideration by regulatory parties. The efforts made in Basel III in order to reduce the 
systemic risk are aligned with small cost for the Swedish banks. Jaffe and Walden (2010) 
argues that the low costs of the implementation and the timetable for this in Basel III makes 
the effects on the Swedish financial system little. 
5.2 Insights from Länsförsäkringar Bank 
This part of the paper will serve as an illustrative example on how the Basel III framework is 
perceived in the Swedish banking industry. We have chosen Länsförsäkringar Bank for this 
matter, which is a relative young bank compared to the other four big banks in Sweden, and 
why we find their thoughts on Basel III particular interesting. Länsförsäkringar Bank is the 
fifth largest retail bank in Sweden, holding a business volume of SEK 290 billion on March 
31, 2013. Länsförsäkringar Bank is a subsidiary of Länsförsäkringar AB, which in turn is 
owned by 23 regional insurance companies, including 130 branch offices, and constitutes 
Länsförsäkringar Alliance. Länsförsäkringar Hypotek AB, Wasa Kredit AB and 
Länsförsäkringar Fondförvaltning is subsidiares of Länsförsäkringar Bank. The foundation for 
its bank operation constitutes from Länsförsäkringar Alliance’s wide-ranging customer base 
and strong brand along with its local presence. In 2012, for the sixth year in row and eight out 
of nine years, Länsförsäkringar was granted with Sweden’s most satisfied retail bank 
customers according to Swedish Quality Index. The number of customers is 964 000, the 
market share for retail and household mortgages was 4.9 % and for deposits the market share 
was 4.4 % in February 28, 2013. 
 
Länsförsäkringar Bank’s thoughts on Basel III is retained from their credit manager Göran 
Zakrisson, who is proficient and well informed on the Basel III implementation and its 
impacts on Länsförsäkringar Bank. Below follows our questions asked and responses from 
Göran Zakrisson; 
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As previously stated in this paper Länsförsäkringar Bank agrees on the fact that Swedish 
banks are not fully exposed to the same risks as other European banks. However we argue that 
there is a potential spill-over effect, which comes from other European countries and will 
cause damage on the Swedish financial markets as well. As Göran Zakrisson states there is a 
1. What is Länsförsäkringar Bank's general perception of the Basel III framework, both for the case 
of Länsförsäkringar Bank and for the case of the Swedish banking system? 
- “It is expressed by the Swedish Bankers Association that the hasty implementation creates a 
risk that there is not enough time for a long-term impact analysis. The aim of the Basel III 
framework is higher capitalization of banks and greater focus on liquidity. The problem lies 
probably not within the Swedish banks, but rather in other European banks and banking 
systems.” 
 
2. How much work has been carried out to evaluate whether Basel III will affect Länsförsäkringar 
Bank's profitability? Are there any strategies to influence the outcome, and if so, do you have 
any examples of such strategies? 
- “A substantial work has been carried out and will continue to do so regarding the 
implementation of Basel III. The liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) is a good example of how 
the pricing of borrowing and deposits is affected by this measure through the structure of 
LCR and what we can include in it.” 
 
3. How could Basel III affect Länsförsäkringar Bank’s growth forecasts? 
- “All banks are reviewing their capital efficiency and when the capital requirement increases 
it follows that banks are conducting reviews on all areas where they intend to grow. 
Further, the situation must be seen more as a compression of the balance sheets rather than 
an expansion.” 
  
4. Apart from Basel I and II, Basel III introduces liquidity requirements. How will this affect 
Länsförsäkringar Bank? 
- “See above answer for LCR.” 
  
5. As Basel III is currently designed, it is intended to reduce banks' risk-taking. With the current 
requirements on capital and liquidity, does Länsförsäkringar Bank believe the requirement of 4.5 
% of core capital to be sufficient for this to happen? 
- “I am convinced that the reduced risk-taking already exists regardless of the level of capital 
requirements.” 
  
6. Regarding the available methods to weight credit risk, standardized approach or the internal 
rating based approach including foundation IRB and advanced IRB, which one of them is 
Länsförsäkringar Bank applying?  
- “The bank uses the advanced IRB approach in virtually all portfolios except the liquidity 
portfolio and lending to bigger companies.” 
 
7. What is Länsförsäkringar Bank's growth strategy and will Basel III affect that much? 
- “See above answer.” 
 
8. What is your opinion about the proposed capital requirement of 20-30 % that many economists 
argue is necessary to acquire in order to stabilize the banking system? 
- “The current concern is the connection between the required amount of capital and its 
eventual affect on lending. There is an obvious worry about the fact that banks do not lend 
sufficiently, which could inhibit the macroeconomic growth.” 
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substantial amount of work undertaken in order to imply the framework of the Basel III and 
he mentions the LCR as a good measurement for evaluating these impacts. 
 
Further, about the proposed capital requirements of 20-30% from a number of economists, we 
agree with Göran regarding the potential inhibition of the macroeconomic growth, but stresses 
the importance of a higher capital requirement ratio and a gradually implementation of it.   
6 Basel III critique 
The implementation of the Basel III accord shall be done in order to reduce all of the 
problems that brought down the financial system in the crisis of 2008. If the new framework 
is developed in order to increase the resilience of the financial system it is of great importance 
that it actually manages to do this. Basel III is often seen as a solution to many of the 
problems enlightened in the previous crisis, but is the status of the accord as good as many 
instances want us to believe? This is a question we will try to answer in this section, and also 
incorporate some of the largest areas of concerns about the Basel III framework. 
 
Many of the academic reports that have been examining the effects of Basel III on the 
banking industry have in turn led to critique. This critique is often concerning the layout of 
the Basel III and if it actually regulates the problem areas that caused the crisis of 2008 to be 
as severe as it turned out to be. A lot of the criticism regarding the framework emerges since it 
is clear that the banks and regulators have different views on how to prevent situations of 
financial stress from emerging. 
 
If it shall be possible to regulate the banking system it is necessary for the regulators to realize 
that the system should not be perceived as an area where it is acceptable to have fragility 
where the default of one actor affects the whole system (Admati & Hellwig, 2013). This since 
it allows banks to maintain their exposures to risk. This risk is in many situations uncalled for 
and expensive for the society. Talking about this risk it has to be stated that previous to the 
crisis, banks was relying heavily on borrowed assets to conduct their operations. In order to 
create a healthier banking industry BCBS has increased the capital ratios in Basel III (Admati 
& Hellwig, 2013).The increased capital requirements in Basel III are often criticized by the 
banks since they claim that this would increase their cost. In contrast to this there are studies 
that show that the capital ratios rather would be 20-30% instead of the current Basel III 
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requirements. If the ratio were set to a higher ratio it would not be aligned with higher cost for 
the banks but rather increases the benefits for the society (Admati & Hellwig, 2013). 
 
Another area subject to criticism is that the increasing complexity of the Basel I, II and III 
accords rather contributes to a situation where it gets easier for the banks to bypass the 
regulations since there will be uncertainty how the requirements is designed and which types 
of organizations that is covered by the accord, we argue that this “bypass” can be both an 
intended and unintended action by the bank. For example this type of holes in the framework 
resulted in activities mitigating from regulated business banks to unregulated investment 
banks. Other ways around the framework, in particular Basel II, was that the rules regarding 
the banks risk weights made it possible for the banks to conceal their risk exposure from 
regulating organizations and investors (Admati, 2012). 
 
When treating the capital ratios and levels of liquidity the Basel III only sets minimum levels 
of requirements. If the goal of a regulation is set to make the financial system more resilient, 
would it not be better to set high targets of requirement levels? This comes from the fact that 
if all nations is striving towards higher requirements it would bring more unity to the 
regulations (Admati, et al., 2011). 
 
If a system is built around a valuation system of risk-weights it gives the banks reasons to 
actually hideaway risk and leverage, which possibly could lead to situations where the banks 
investments is done in assets with low risk weights but this does not say anything about the 
underlying risk.  The system of risk-weights also contributes to cases where banks actively 
work to transfer away risk from its books. Since Basel III uses risk-weights it can contribute 
to the fact that banks will increase their use of CDS´s or swaps of different kinds. These 
actions will increase the systemic risk of the financial system even more. 
7 Conclusion 
After reading this paper, it is not an understatement saying that the Basel III accord is a 
framework of complexity and ambiguity. We argue, that because of this, there is an imminent 
risk that the accord is being misinterpreted, and that only a small number of individuals will 
be well-informed of it. As we mentioned in the critique section this can lead to situations were 
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banks and bank managers tries to surpass regulation by interpret the accord as favorable as 
possible, even if this off-sets the intended purpose of Basel III. 
 
However, we argue that the Basel III accord is in fact an important step towards a more 
resilient banking system, but stresses the fact that it needs to be revised in a number of areas. 
As many economists argue, we agree on the fact that the capital requirement should be even 
higher in the future, but accentuate the importance of a successive implementation where the 
macro-economic stability is not threatened. We would also like to see additional parts of the 
framework that more specifically addresses issues regarding both systemic risk and shadow 
banking. Another thing that should be revisited in Basel III is if the capital ratios are enough 
to actually have an impact on the banks so that they actually reduce their borrowing to 
conduct their operations. In fact the capital ratios could be much higher in order to maximize 
the social benefit of regulations.  
 
The rhetoric used by banks often states that it is unreasonably high costs associated with the 
higher capital ratios and will therefore impose stress on the banks finances. As we saw in the 
impact section there is an exaggeration about these statements and a cost impact is fairly 
moderate in these cases. We argue that this rhetorical issue both depends on banks willingness 
to impose increased costs on to its customers and the fact that there is a lack of knowledge in 
concepts and definitions.  
 
In order to give the regulations full and effective power, we argue that there is a need for a 
change in the role of the government and its financial support toward banks. The current 
structure, and the concept of to-big-to-fail, allows banks to take on more risk than desired to 
experience great profits on the upside whereas an eventual downside will be paid by the 
government, and subsequently the taxpayers. There is a large possibility that banks continues 
to act in a irresponsible way, maybe unintended, as long as this relationship exists and despite 
new requirements on capital and liquidity. 
 
Regarding the implementation of the Basel III accord in Sweden it can be concluded that it 
will decrease the systemic risk and that the cost aligned with this will be fairly low. We want 
to highlight the relatively long transition period which will help to recify for eventual 
unintended side effects of the Basel III accord implementation.        
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Finally we want to emphasize that the implementation of the Basel III accord needs to be 
carried out in an era that not suffers from financial crisis. This since there could be a need for 
banks to act as a catalyst for the economy and partly deviate from the regulations in less stable 
financial periods. 
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